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RLI1.SAND STATUTES 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to UCA 
§ 7S-2-2 &nd Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs/Appellants to recover 
compensatory and punitive damages against State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") for wrongfully, and in 
bad faith, demanding subrogation monies from a wrongful death 
settlement that was wholly inadequate to fairly compensate 
Plaintiffs/Appellants for the loss of their children. This is an appeal 
from judgments entered on March 26, 1990, June 11, 1990 and the 
Court's Minute Entry, dated February 7, 1990 by the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable David S. 
Young presiding. These judgments and orders became final by virtue 
of the Court's judgment entered June 11, 1990 resolving all 
remaining issues as to all remaining parties. 
In the Minute Order, dated February 7, 1990, the Third Judicial 
District Court, denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a First 
Amended Complaint [R. 278-287] to specifically allege independent 
tort claims against State Farm. The date of the District Court's non-
final Minute Order denying Appellants leave to amend this Complaint 
is February 7, 1990. This non-final order became final pursuant to 
the Court's judgment entered on June 11, 1990 resolving all 
remaining issues as to all remaining parties. 
In the judgement, entered on March 26, 1990, the Third 
Judicial District Court dismissed all claims of Appellant Hill for the 
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reason that Appellant Hill was not in privity of contract with State 
Farm; further, the Court dismissed all punitive damage claims against 
all Appellants for the reason that no independent tortious conduct 
was alleged against State Farm. In the judgement, entered on June 
11, 1990, the Third Judicial District Court dismissed all remaining 
claims against Appellant Caldwell. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
a. Whether material issues of fact exist to prove that State 
Farm had no legal right to subrogation and reimbursement against 
the Appellants1 settlement on the CUMIS policy. 
b. Whether naterial issues of fact exist to prove that the 
acts and omissions of State Farm in causing CUMIS to withhold 
subrogation and reimbursement payments were in bad faith. 
c. Whether Appellants' release of Bryan constituted 
material breach of the insurance contract thereby entitling State 
Farm to subrogation reimbursement as a matter of equity. 
d. Whether material issues of fact exist to place the burden 
of proof on State Farm to prove that its subrogation demands against 
Appellants were in fact accurate and in good faith. 
e. Whether Appellants' original complaint sets forth 
adequate allegations of actionable bad faith conduct against State 
Farm; 
f. Whether good cause and the interests of justice required 
the District Court to grant leave for Appellants to file their first 
amended complaint; 
. 9 . 
g. Whether Appellant Hill has legal standing and injury to 
assert an actionable bad faith claim against State Farm for its 
violation of Utah's doctrine of "equitable subrogation" 
h. Whether Appellant Hill was in privity of contract 
sufficient to assert an actionable bad faith claim against State Farm; 
i. Whether material issues of fact exist as to whether State 
Farm is liable to Appellants for punitive damages for its bad faith 
misconduct in pursuing subrogation and reimbursement from the 
CUMIS policy and settlement. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND CASES 
While the issues before the Court are fact intensive, the 
statutes, rules and cases, inter alia, believed to be determinative uf 
such issues are as follows: 
1. Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 480 P.2d 
739 (Utah 1971). 
2. Transamerica Ins. Co. vs. Barnes. 505 P.2d 783 (Utah 
1972). 
3 . Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 
Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988). 
4. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
5. Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., Ill P.2d 325 
(Utah 1988). 
6. Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah 
App. 1987) 
7. Leigh Furniture and Carpet v. ham, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1982). 
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8. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 
P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
9. Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 
(Utah 1983). 
10. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs/Appellants to recover 
compensatory and punitive damages against State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company for wrongfully, and in bad faith, 
demanding subrogation monies from a wrongful death settlement 
that was wholly inadequate to fairly compensate 
Plaintiffs/Appellants for the loss of their children. 
(B) Course of Proceedings 
The Hills and Caldwells commenced this action seeking 
payment of $5,510 and alleging bad faith against State Farm for its 
pursuit of a subrogation claim against the settlement monies from 
the tortfeasor's (Bryan) insurance company (CUMIS). [R. 2-6] In 
-turn, State Farm filed a third-party claim against Bryan for 
subrogation and indemnity; and State Farm counterclaimed against 
Appellants for $5,510. [R. 56-59] State Farm filed a motion for 
summary judgment on both Appellants1 complaints and on its own 
counterclaim. [R. 94-95] The District Court granted the motion, 
awarding State Farm $5,510, interest and attorney's fees. The Court 
also ruled that State Farm had no cause of action against Bryan. [R. 
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135-138] The Hills and Caldwells appealed the decisions of the 
District Court. [R. 139-141] The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the 
District Court's granting of summary judgment and remanded the 
case back to the District Court. Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah, 1988). The Supreme Court held as 
follows: 
. . . we hold that in the absence of specific 
contractual terms in either the release and 
settlement or the insurance policy, the insured 
must be made whole prior to any recovery by the 
insurer against the tort-feasor. Where the insured 
settles with the tort-feasor, the settlement amount 
goes to the insured unless the insurer can prove 
that the insured has already received full 
compensation. [Id. at 869] 
The Court went on to hold that the amount of the Appellants' 
damages was a question of fact which had yet to be determined. [Id. 
at 868] 
(C) Disposition in the Court Below 
After the remand of the case to the District Court, State Farm 
tendered $5,510, plus accrued interest, to the Caldwells as full 
relinquishment of its subrogation claim from the CUMIS settlement 
monies. [R. 217] State Farm then moved for summary judgment 
against Hill and for partial summary judgment on Appellants' claim 
for punitive damages. [R. 211-247] Appellants moved the District 
Court for leave to file their First Amended Complaint, which formally 
added a tort cause of action against State Farm for interference with 
contract and loss of economic relations. [R. 278-287] The District 
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Court on March 26, 1990, granted State Farm's motion for summary 
judgment against Hill and motion to dismiss punitive damages. On 
April 26, 1990, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment to 
dismiss all remaining claims against Caldwells. [R. 352-355] On June 
11, 1990, the District Court granted State Farm's motion. [R. 368-
369] 
Appellants appeal the District Court's grant of summary 
judgments in favor of State Farm, and they appeal the order of the 
District Court in denying them leave to file their First Amended 
Complaint. 
(D) Statement of the Facts 
On June 6, 1982 Appellant Caldwell was the owner of an 
automobile which was involved in a collision while being driven by 
Appellant Caldwell's son, Troy. Appellant Hill's daughter, Tamara, 
was riding as a passenger in the vehicle. The automobile accident 
was with a vehicle driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan and the collision 
resulted in the deaths of Appellant Caldwell's son and Appellant 
Hill's daughter, both minors at the time. [R. 2-6, 260-261] 
On June 6, 1982 Appellant Caldwell owned an insurance policy 
through State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company insuring 
his automobile which was involved in the accident providing 
coverage, among other things, for collision damage to the named 
vehicle and PIP coverage. [R. 2-6, 261] 
On June 6, 1982 the vehicle involved in the accident being 
driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan was insured by the CUMIS Insurance 
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Society, Inc. The collision was caused by the negligence and 
intoxication of Kenneth Paul Bryan. [R. 2-6, 212] 
As a proximate result of the accident, the 1979 Honda of 
Appellant Caldwell was damaged in the sum of $5,510.00, which, 
under the terms of Appellant's insurance contract with State Farm, 
was paid for through his collision protection. [R. 2-6] 
The contract of insurance between Appellant Caldwell and 
State Farm included a provision for recovery for his insured 
automobile in the event of a collision which provided as follows: 
Physical Damage Coverage Insuring Agreements, 
Coverage G: 
To pay for loss to the ^wned motor vehicle caused 
by collision but only for the amount of each such 
loss in excess of the deductible amount stated in the 
declarations as applicable hereto. If the deductible 
amount is $100 or less it shall not apply if the 
collision is with another motor vehicle insured with 
this company. [R. 212-213, 234] 
The definitions contained in Section III of Appellant's 
insurance contract with State Farm included the following: 
Collision—means collision of a motor vehicle covered 
by this policy with another object or with a vehicle 
to which it is attached or upset of such motor 
vehicle. [236] 
* * * * 
Loss—wherever used with respect to coverages D, F, 
G, R and Rl, means each direct and accidental loss 
of or damage to 
(1) an owned motor vehicle, or 
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(2) its equipment. 
Under coverages D, F, and G, loss includes direct and 
accidental damage to wearing apparel and luggage. 
Owner Motor Vehicle—Means the motor vehicle or 
trailer described in the declarations, and includes a 
temporary substitute automobile and a newly-
acquired automobile. IR. 213, 236] 
Appellant Caldwell's State Farm insurance contract included a 
provision for the recovery of Personal Injury Protection—no fault 
benefits at paragraph 5 of the policy conditions, which states, in 
pertinent part: 
5. Trust Agreement—Coverages P [Personal 
Injury Protection (P.I.P.)] and U. In the event of 
payment to any person under coverage P or U: 
(a) The company shall be entitled to the 
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any 
settlement or judgment that may result from the 
exercise of any rights of recovery of such person 
against any person or organization legally 
responsible for the bodily injury because of which 
such payment is made; 
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the 
benefit of the company all rights of recovery which 
he or she shall have against such other person or 
organization because of the damages which are the 
subject of claim made under the coverages; [R. 239] 
[R. 259-270] 
Appellant Caldwell received no-fault benefit payments through 
his State Farm contract in the amount of $6,539.00, and Appellant 
Hill received no-fault benefit payments through Caldwell's State 
Farm contract in the amount of $6,120.00 [R. 212] 
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Kenneth Paul Bryan was driving an automobile insured by the 
CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., with a singe limit liability insurance 
coverage on the automobile in the amount of $50,000.00, which 
amount was immediately tendered to Appellants Caldwell and Hill 
($25,000.00 each) for the loss of their children. [R. 213-214] 
The wrongful deaths of the Appellant's children far exceeded in 
value the sum of $25,000.00 per wrongful death, or a cumulative 
total of $50,000 as insurance afforded by the CUMIS single limit 
policy. [R. 273] 
Appellants arrived at a reasonable compromise solution and 
settlement with Kenneth Paul Bryan in the sum of the policy limits of 
$50,000, but were unable to conclude their settlement of the 
litigation because State Farm failed and refused to acknowledge that 
there was insufficient insurance coverage to satisfy the entire claim 
of the plaintiffs for the loss of their children; instead, State Farm 
demanded that the sum of $5,510 in collision payment made to 
Appellant Caldwell and the PIPS payments to Appellants be 
reimbursed to State Farm out of the insurance policy liability limits 
of Kenneth Paul Bryan. [R. 4-5, 262] 
The State Farm insurance policy of Appellant Caldwell included 
a condition regarding State Farm's right to subrogation which states, 
in pertinent part: 
Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy . . . 
the company shall be subrogated to all the insured's 
rights of recovery therefor and the insured shall do 
whatever is necessary to secure such rights and do 
nothing to prejudice them. [R. 212, 239] 
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State Farm failed to join in the litigation and refused to 
cooperate in settlement of the litigation by the plaintiffs for the 
insufficient funds afforded by the CUMIS insurance coverage. [R. 2-
6] 
Appellants investigated the feasibility of litigation and possible 
recovery against Kenneth Paul Bryan, independent of the insurance 
coverage and determined that Kenneth Paul Bryan was insolvent. [R. 
5, 174, 175] 
State Farm failed to investigate the feasibility of contingent 
litigation and possible recovery against Kenneth Paul Bryan, or in the 
alternative, knew that Kenneth Paul Bryan was essentially judgment 
proof and insolvent. [R. 2-6, 174, 175] 
State Farm knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
liability insurance coverage by CUMIS afforded Kenneth Paul Bryan 
was wholly inadequate to fully and fairly compensate Appellants for 
the loss of their children. [R. 2-6, 174, 175] 
State Farm demanded of Appellants that the PIPS ($12,659.00) 
and collision ($5,510.00) payments be subrogated and reimbursed to 
State Farm from the corpus of the $50,000 settlement with CUMIS 
and Kenneth Paul Bryan. [R. 271-274, 174, 175] 
It was necessary for Appellants to hire an attorney to deal with 
State Farm relative to its claims for recovery of the PIP monies and 
subrogation for the property damages. [R. 271-274, 174, 175] 
Only upon intercession by Appellants attorney did State Farm 
determine not to further pursue recovery of the PIP monies. [R. 
271-274] 
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The CUMIS policy, with a single liability limit of $50,000.00, 
was not sufficient to satisfy Appellant's wrongful death claims. [R. 
271-274] 
Appellant's attorney was told by the State Farm claims man for 
the Appellant's claims, that if Appellants wished to prove that the 
deaths of their children were worth $25,000.00 or more each, 
Appellants would have to litigate the matter with the tortfeasor and 
prove the children's worth to State Farm. [R. 271-274] 
Appellants' attorney made it clear to the State Farm claims 
man that the costs of litigating the worth of the two children would 
exceed the recovery claimed by State Farm. [R. 271-274] 
Appellants' attorney offered to let State Farm proceed with 
subrogation at State Farm's cost; State Farm refused. [R. 271-274] 
Appellants, and their wives, signed separate releases in favor 
of Bryan, CUMIS and others. The release signed by Caldwell and his 
wife recited consideration of $27,755 and specifically stated that 
$5,510 of that recited consideration "represents damage to the 
undersigned's automobile and that such amount will be made 
payable by separate check to State Farm and Lorin D. Caldwell, 
wherein a controversy exists between State Farm and Lorin D. 
Caldwell as to who is entitled to the said amount, and that the matter 
will be resolved between the two or by payment into court or by 
judicial determination." [R. 214-215] 
The release signed by plaintiff Hill and his wife received 
consideration of $22,245.00 and specifically state that: 
It is understood that the above amount of twenty 
two thousand two hundred and forty five and 
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no/100 Dollars ($22,245.00) represents twenty five 
thousand and no/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) policy 
limits less the collision claim of five thousand five 
hundred ten and no/100 Dollars ($5,510.00) by 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, wherein a 
controversy exists as to who is entitled to the said 
amount, and that the matter will be resolved 
between the two or by pay into court or by judicial 
determination. [R. 262] 
Since the Supreme Court decision in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., reversing summary judgment, State Farm has 
paid the $5,510 plus interest to Caldwell. [R. 217] 
The only fact before the trial court since the Supreme Court decision 
is that State Farm has finally, after nearly six (6) years, paid the contested 
subrogation claim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court remanded this case to determine 
whether State Farm was warranted in its subrogation claim against 
the settlement proceeds from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier, 
CUMIS. The Supreme Court made it clear that the insured (the 
Caldwells and the Hills) must first be made whole prior to any 
recovery by State Farm against the tortfeasor; the Court held that the 
'settlement monies go to the insured unless the insurer can prove 
that the insured has already received full compensation. In the 
instant case, the Court held that Appellants' damages are questions of 
fact to be determined. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on all of 
Appellants' claims was improper and contrary to the directives of the 
Supreme Court of Utah. In spite of compelling evidence that the 
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tortfeasor was insolvent and had wholly inadequate insurance 
($25,000 per person) to compensate Appellants for the loss of their 
two teenage children, the trial court improperly released State Farm 
from its burden of proving that Appellants received full 
compensation in spite of the fact that Appellants have alleged bad 
faith conduct on the part of State Farm for knowingly interfering 
with the settlement with the tortfeasor's carrier, and in spite of 
compelling evidence that State Farm knowingly interfered with the 
settlement after being placed on actual notice of the inadequate low 
policy limits to compensate Appellants, the trial court improperly 
relieved State Farm from accountability for its egregious conduct. In 
spite of the tortious conduct of State Farm in interfering with the 
Appellants' settlement with the tortfeasor's carrier, the trial court 
improperly relieved State Farm from punitive damage determination 
by the trier of fact. 
This Court should review the evidentiary record of this case 
and determine that material issues of fact exist sufficient to allow the 
trier of fact in this case to conclude that State Farm wrongfully, and 
in bad faith, prosecuted a subrogation claim against CUMIS and 
Appellants; that such wrongful conduct by State Farm was the 
proximate cause of undue special and general damage to Appellants; 
that relinquishment by State Farm, after the Supreme Court decision 
in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. of its 
subrogation claim cannot purge the years of detriment suffered by 
Appellants as a result of State Farm's bad faith; that material issues 
of fact exist sufficient to allow the trier of fact to award punitive 
damages against State Farm for its wrongful conduct. 
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The trial court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion to 
allow Appellants to file a First Amended Complaint identifying the 
tortious conduct of State Farm as intentional interference with a 
contract; the amendment presented no new material issue of fact nor 
did it present any prejudice to State Farm. 
The trial court erred in finding that Appellant Hill had no legal 
standing to assert bad faith claim against State Farm. Appellants 
submit that material issues of fact exist to prove Hill was in privity 
of contract with State Farm. 
ARGLTMENT 
POINT I: MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST TO PROVE 
THAT STATE FARM HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT TO 
SUBROGATION AND REIMBURSEMENT 
AGAINST APPELLANTS1 SETTLEMENT ON THE 
CUMIS POLICY. 
On November 17, 1983, Appellants filed a Complaint in Salt 
Lake County, Third Judicial District Court [R. 2-6] seeking money 
damages and punitive damages against State Farm on the grounds of 
bad faith. The thrust of Appellants' Complaint was that State Farm 
was without any reasonable justification whatsoever in its , 
subrogation claim from the proceeds of the $50,000.00 policy limits 
settlement for the tragic wrongful deaths of two Utah teenagers. The 
very heart of Appellants' original Complaint was the bad faith of 
State Farm; to-wit: 
12. That the above-named Plaintiffs arrived at a 
compromise solution and settlement with the driver of 
the vehicle causing said accident in the sum of the policy 
limits of $50,000, but were unable to conclude their 
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settlement of the litigation because the above-named 
Defendant failed and refused, and still refuses to 
acknowledge that there was insufficient insurance 
coverage to satisfy the entire claims of the Plaintiffs, and 
has demanded that the sum of $5,510 in collision 
payment make to Lorin Dean Caldwell be reimbursed to 
the Defendant out of the insurance policy limits of the 
driver of said vehicle causing said accident, [R. 4-5] 
13. That Defendant State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company failed to join in said 
litigation and refused to cooperate in settlement of said 
litigation by the Plaintiffs for the insufficient funds 
afforded by the insurance coverage evidencing bad faith 
toward its insureds in attempting to settle said litigation. 
[Plaintiffs' Complaint, R. 5] (emphasis added) 
Appellants went on to seek the following relief from the District 
Court: 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the Defendant be 
required to endorse said check payable to the Plaintiffs 
for the $5,510.00 remaining unpaid on the death claim of 
the Plaintiffs as personal representatives of said minor 
decedents, that Plaintiffs recover their attorney's fees in 
a reasonable sum to be determined by the court herein, 
together with punitive damages for bad faith in 
obstructing settlement of Plaintiffs' claim against a tort 
feasor and causing unnecessary litigation where it is 
obvious that the insurance coverage afforded by the tort 
feasor's vehicle was inadequate to satisfy said death 
claims, together with Plaintiffs' costs of suit incurred 
herein, and such other and further relief as the Court 
deems proper in the premises. [Plaintiffs' Complaint, R. 
5-6] (emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged Appellants' claim in Hill, et 
al v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 864, 865 (Utah 
1988): 
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Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of defendant, arguing 
that numerous triable issues of fact exist and 
claiming bad faith, (emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment against plaintiffs. In 
reversing the summary judgment, the Supreme Court unequivocally 
placed the burden on State Farm to justify its subrogation claim from 
the settlement proceeds: 
. . . State Farm's only recourse is to show either that 
plaintiffs were fully compensated and thus State 
Farm is entitled to be reimbursed from Bryan's 
insurance policy proceeds or that plaintiffs1 action 
in releasing Bryan breached the insurance policy, 
and if State Farm shows it could have recovered 
from Bryan, it will be entitled to the proceeds as a 
matter of equity. [Id. at 869] 
On remand to the District Court, State Farm made no effort to 
meet that burden. It is obvious that it could not under the clear facts 
of this case. The uncontroverted, unimpeached and unassailable 
facts of this case is that $25,000 for Appellant Hill's teenage 
daughter, Tamara Hill, was wholly inadequate compensation for her 
wrongful death; and that $25,000 for Appellant Caldwell's son, Troy 
Caldwell, was wholly inadequate compensation for his wrongful 
death. (See Lauchnor Affidavit R 2-6; Hill deposition R. 175 at page 
46, line 2; Caldwell deposition R. 174 at page 32, line 15, page 34, 
line 16.) 
After the Supreme Court decision, it is clear that State Farm 
very much wanted this case to go away. It tendered full 
reimbursement of the claimed subrogated monies of $5,510, together 
with accrued interest. [R. 217] State Farm then moved for summary 
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judgment claiming that the case was over. Appellants protest and 
contend that the case should not be over. The issues of State Farm's 
unwarranted acts and omissions, and bad faith over these long years 
cannot simply be eliminated by tender of a few thousand dollars in 
the face of the losses and damages suffered by Appellants. 
Both the original Complaint [R. 2-6] and proposed First 
Amended Complaint [R. 280-287] of Appellants make clear what 
economic hardships and emotional losses that State Farm's 
unwarranted claim of subrogation from the proposed $50,000 
settlement caused them; to-wit: 
(1) for a unreasonable period of time, the 
Appellants wert needlessly without their 
rightful settlement monies; 
(2) for a unreasonable period of time, Appellants 
had to assume a senseless legal and 
economical burden to hire a lawyer to fight 
for their rightful claim to the full settlement 
monies from CUMIS; a fight that required 
grief-stricken and devastated parents to file a 
lawsuit and ultimately take their case to the 
Supreme Court of Utah to vindicate their 
rights; 
(3) At the time State Farm was pursuing the 
subrogation claims, Appellant Hill was not 
financially strong. He did not have any 
savings and, for a period of time after the 
accident, was totally incapable of working. He 
had to take handouts from others to keep his 
family going. The severe emotional impact of 
the death of his daughter was a surprise to 
him which he did net anticipate. [R. 175, page 
14, line 7] 
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Appellants contend that the Utah Supreme Court remanded this 
case to the District Court to address not only the issue of whether 
State Farm was entitled to withhold the alleged subrogation monies 
of $5,510 from the proceeds of the CUMIS settlement of $50,000, but 
to address the issues of whether State Farm's refusal to relinquish its 
subrogation claims from the CUMIS settlement was in bad faith, and 
what injuries and damages did Appellants suffer as a result of State 
Farm's bad faith. 
POINT II: MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST TO PROVE 
THAT STATE FARM'S ACTS AND OMISSIONS 
IN CAUSING CUMIS TO WITHHOLD 
SUBROGATION AND REIMBURSEMENT 
PAYMENT CONSTITUTE ACTIONABLE BAD 
FAITH. 
In addressing the subrogation issue, the Supreme Court made 
the following determination: 
In the case now before the Court, the insurer's 
right to subrogation was set forth in the insurance 
policy. Unfortunately, the record does not reveal 
the extent of the subrogation terms, nor does it 
provide a complete copy of the insurance policy. 
We are thus unable to ascertain the intent of the 
parties as to the extent of their respective rights 
under the subrogation clause. Therefore, the 
doctrine of subrogation should be applied in this 
case according to general principles of equity. 
Nothing that State Farm has adduced on remand alters the 
application of equitable subrogation principles to the circumstances 
of this case. The insurance policy is now a part of the record of this 
case [R. 225-247]; the subrogation clause states in pertinent part: 
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Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy . . . 
the company shall be subrogated to all the insured's 
rights of recovery therefor and the insured shall do 
whatever is necessary to secure such rights and do 
nothing to prejudice them. 
Such vague language merely establishes a general right of State Farm 
to subrogation. It does not contain express terms to reverse the 
equitable subrogation principles established in Lyon v. Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Co., 480 P.2d 739 (Utah 1971) that the 
insured must be made whole prior to any recovery by the insurer 
against the tortfeasor. In fact, the subrogation clause in the instant 
case is identical to the one in Lyon, to-wit: 
. . . the company shall be subrogated to all the 
rights of recovery therefor which the injured 
person or anyone receiving such payment may 
have against any person or organization and such 
person shall execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure 
such rights. Such person shall do nothing after loss 
to prejudice such rights. [Id. at 744] 
Notwithstanding the subrogation clause, the Supreme Court in Lyon 
stated: 
In the instant action, there are no terms in 
this general subrogation clause which would 
support Hartford's subrogation claim to the $2,000, 
while plaintiff remains uncompensated for her total 
damages. [Id. at 745] 
The Court went on to apply the same equitable principles of 
subrogation as did the Court in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm 
Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988). As the plaintiffs 
damages in Lyon exceeded the applicable policy limits, the Court 
observed that there was no double recovery by the injured party. 
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[Id. at 744] (See, also, Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes, 
505 P.2d 783 (Utah 1972).) 
The Supreme Court in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm Insurance 
Company echoed the equitable principles of subrogation set forth in 
Lyon: 
. . . where the language of the release leaves the 
allocation uncertain and where there is no 
controlling contractual language to the contrary, the 
insured should be given the benefit of the doubt as 
to its damages and the burden will rest with the 
insurer to prove that the insured has been fully 
compensated. [Id. at 868] (emphasis added) 
Accordingly, the burden is on State Farm to prove that both the Hills 
and Caldwells have been fully compensated by virtue of the CUMIS 
settlement of $25,000 for each death. The record is devoid of any 
evidence submitted by State Farm to meet its burden; to the 
contrary, the compelling evidence in the record is that the CUMIS 
insurance proceeds were wholly inadequate to fully compensate 
Appellants for loss of their children. 
Regardless of whether or not Appellants are entitled to pursue 
punitive damages against State Farm, it is clear that State Farm owed 
Appellants an implied good faith and fair dealing obligation. Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). The 
evidence adduced by Appellants' legal counsel, Wallace R. Lauchnor, 
demonstrates material issues of fact exist as to whether State Farm 
breached this obligation in several different regards; to-wit: 
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(1) 2. On or about February 1, 1983 
Lorin Dean Caldwell and Robert Kent and 
Janet Hill came to me to see if they could 
obtain some help, after Mr. Hill and Mr. 
Caldwell were informed by State Farm that 
they would not permit them to accept 
settlement of insurance monies from CUMIS 
without litigation unless State Farm's claim 
for subrogation was honored by a payment to 
State Farm for their collision loss. The State 
Farm adjuster or claims manager also wanted 
to withhold from the payment the money 
paid under PIP no fault. [Lauchnor affidavit, 
R. 272] 
(2) State Farm persisted in pursuing the 
subrogation claim even after being notified that it 
was not entitled to it under Utah law: 
4. On several occasions I contacted 
State Farm's claims man and discussed the 
matter with him, bringing to his attention the 
fact that under the Utah case law he was not 
entitled to claim any subrogation on the PIP 
payments. [Lauchnor affidavit, R. 272] 
(3) That State Farm not only intentionally refused 
to relinquish their claims, but took the position that 
the Hills and Caldwells would have to prove that 
the deaths of two high school students were worth 
more than $25,000.00 each by going to the expense 
of filing a lawsuit and senselessly getting a large 
judgment against an insolvent defendant (Bryan): 
8. I again contacted State Farm's 
claims man but was told that they would not 
relinquish their claim under any 
circumstance. He made it very clear to me 
that if we wished to prove that the deaths of 
the two high school students were worth 
$25,000 or more each, the Hills and Caldwells 
would have to litigate the matter with the 
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tortfeasor and prove to him that this be the 
case. [Lauchnor affidavit, R. 273] 
(4) That State Farm persisted in their wrongful 
conduct even after being advised that such 
litigation was not economically or emotionally 
warranted for the Hills and Caldwells: 
9. I made it very clear to the State 
Farms claims man that the amount involved 
would not warrant either Mr. Hill or Mr, 
Caldwell spending such money to hire counsel, 
as the attorney's fees and court costs would 
exceed the recovery being claimed by State 
Farm. I further pointed out that the insureds 
were going to end up spending more money 
to try to prove State Farm's claim of 
subrogation than the claim was worth, and 
that this simply was unjust. [Lauchnor 
affidavit, R. 273-274] 
(5) That State Farm refused when offered the 
opportunity to proceed with subrogation if it would 
pay for the costs and legal fees: 
10, I also then offered to let State 
Farm proceed with subrogation and pay their 
own counsel if they so desired but felt it was 
grossly unfair to expect the insured and Mr. 
Hill to foot the bill for this litigation where the 
money had already been offered by the 
tortfeasor's carrier. He nevertheless refused 
to acquiesce in any of these suggestions. 
[Lauchnor affidavit, R. 274] 
To allow State Farm to escape responsibility for such egregious 
and unfair dealings with its insureds by simply tendering $5,510, 
plus interest, on remand is not the proper message to send an 
insurance carrier in State Farm's shoes. It tells the carrier that it can 
be wholly unreasonable for years and years toward its insured, and 
. 0 9 -
hope that the insured will capitulate in the face of such behavior, and 
if they don't capitulate, tender the money years down the road after 
substantial damage and hardship to the insureds has been done. It is 
Appellants1 contention that the public policy of Utah will not permit a 
carrier to do these things with impunity. The carrier must be held 
accountable. 
POINT in : APPELLANTS' ORIGINAL COMPLAINT STATES 
AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM AGAINST STATE 
FARM FOR BOTH BAD FAITH AND PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES; GOOD CAUSE AND THE INTERESTS 
OF JUSTICE REQUIRED THE TRL\L COURT TO 
GRANT APPELLANTS' LEAVE TO FILE THEIR 
AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
As stated above, Appellants contend that the original Complaint 
sufficiently plead bad faith against State Farm. The purpose of the 
proposed First Amended Complaint was not only to plead in greater 
factual detail, but to also make more specific the tortious conduct of 
State Farm for purposes of the punitive damages claim against State 
Farm. [R. 278-287, 313-316] 
Count II of Appellants' First Amended Complaint was for 
intentional interference with contract and economic relations. [R. 
.285-286] The evidenciary allegations supporting those torts were 
essentially the same evidenciary allegations plead in Appellants' 
original Complaint. The purpose of the First Amended Complaint was 
to clarify Appellants1 legal position on punitive damages to 
correspond with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
State Farm argued that amendments after remand should not 
have been allowed as they were inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's ruling. In support thereof, State Farm cites for its only 
authority: H6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
§ 1498, which states, in part: 
'Once the case has been remanded, the lower court 
will permit new issues to be presented by an 
amended pleading that is consistent with the 
judgment of the appellant court/" 
Such quote was horribly taken out of context; Wright & Miller 
actually states: 
Although amendments to the original pleadings 
generally may not be made once the suit has 
reached the appellate level, if the court of appeals 
determines that the lower court impliedly tried the 
case on a theory not set forth in the pleadings, it 
may permit a conforming amendment—in effect 
under Rule 15(b) (or at least by analogy to it)—to 
include that theory in the trial record. More 
importantly, if the appellate court decides that the 
district court abused its discretion in refusing to 
allow an amendment, or did not give a party a 
sufficient opportunity to cure the defects in his 
pleadings and state a claim for relief, it may 
remand the case with directions to allow the 
appellant to amend. Once the case has been 
remanded, the lower court will permit new issues 
to be presented bv an amendment pleading that is 
consistent with the judgment of the appellate court. 
[Id. at §1498] (emphasis added) 
While the consistency or inconsistency of the Supreme Court's 
judgment in the instant case is not relevant to whether Appellants 
should be allowed to amend their Complaint, the amendment sought 
is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling. 
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The Supreme Court's actual judgment in Hill v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988), 
was that "Summary Judgment in favor of State Farm on Plaintiffs' 
Complaints and on State Farm's counterclaim is reversed." 
Appellants' Complaint sets forth all the requisites of the tort 
claim for interference with economic relations. To state a claim for 
intentional interference with economic relations, the plaintiff must 
show: 
(1) That the defendant intentionally interfered 
with the plaintiffs' existing or potential economic 
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by 
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff, 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isam, 
657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982) 
All that the proposed First Amended Complaint seeks to do is 
give a name to the tortious conduct of State Farm consistent with 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isam. It did not specifically claim 
relief based on intentional interference with economic relations. The 
amendment sought clearly asks for >uch relief. [R. 313-316] The 
proposed amendment presents no new factual issues in the case and 
in no way prejudiced State Farm or served to expand discovery or 
delay the prosecution of the action. The interests of justice justified 
the District Court in permitting the filing of the First Amended 
Complaint. Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P. To rule otherwise under the 
circumstances of this case was an abuse of discretion. Lloyd's 
Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 
(Utah 1983). 
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While Appellants' original Complaint did not, however, AT 
specifically claim for relief based upon intentional interference with 
economic relations, the material allegations and elements of the tort 
claim were indeed included in the Complaint. For example, the 
original Complaint specifically alleges that Appellants "were unable 
to conclude the wrongful death settlements because [State Farm] 
failed and refused, and still refuses to acknowledge that there were 
insufficient insurance coverage to satisfy the entire claims of 
plaintiffs. . . ." [Complaint, R. 5, paragraph 12] The Complaint goes on 
to specifically allege that State Farm "refused to cooperate in the 
settlement of said litigation by the plaintiffs for the insufficient 
funds afforded by the insurance coverage evidencing the bad faith 
toward its insureds in attempting to settle this litigation. [Complaint, 
R. 5, paragraph 13] 
Appellants claim punitive damages arising from the intentional 
interference alleging that State Farm's actions were malicious or 
were taken with wanton disregard for Appellants' rights. [R. 267-
268] Appellants contend such allegations, together with the evidence 
of record in the instant action, is sufficient for the trier of fact to 
award punitive damages. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Co., 701 P.2d 
795 (Utah 1985). 
While State Farm claims that Beck does not provide for 
punitive damages in a First Party bad faith case, the Court of Appeals 
(per Judges Greenwood, Bench and Billings) in Gagon v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah App. 1987), 
reversed and remanded a district court directed verdict in a First 
Party bad faith action. As part of his appeal, plaintiff Gagon claimed 
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that the district court improperly excluded evidence of punitive 
damages and consequentual damages, including attorney's fees. The 
court found no error in such exclusion for the reason that the parties 
had stipulated, and the district court had agreed, to exclude evidence 
of punitive damages until the jury had found State Farm had acted in 
bad faith. The court concluded its opinion with the statement that: 
If lack of good faith is found on remand, 
consideration of punitive damages and 
consequentual damages will be appropriate. 
[Id. at 1197] 
In Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., Ill P.2d 325 
(Utah 1988), State Farm's petition for certiorari was denied without 
opinion by the Supreme Court alihough Justice Zimmerman provided 
a concurring opinion, which opinion was quoted at length by 
Defendant in its brief. The concurring opinion is little more than a 
brief recitation of that part of the Beck opinion which held that a 
plaintiff was not entitled to put on punitive damage evidence unless 
the plaintiff could make a sufficient case to go to the jury on an 
independent tort theory. What is, perhaps, more notable is the fact 
that a majority of the Court did not join in Justice Zimmerman's 
affirmance of that portion of Beck. Appellants assert that based on 
the Gagon opinions, the Supreme Court considers that punitive 
damages are "appropriate" for "lack of good faith" in First Party 
actions. 
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POINT IV: APPELLANT HILL HAS LEGAL STANDING TO 
ASSERT A BAD FAITH CLAIM AGAINST STATE 
FARM; HILL WAS IN PRIVITY OF CONTRACT 
WITH STATE FARM. 
Appellants complain of State Farm's actions in its wrongful 
attempts to enforce the subrogation and Trust Agreement provisions 
of the State Farm automobile policy. It is essential to recognize that 
State Farm first attempted to recover not only the monies it paid to 
Caldwell for property damage but also the monies it paid to Hill and 
Caldwell for P.I.P. [Lauchnor Affidavit, R. 292-273, paragraphs 2-5] 
It cannot be seriously argued but that State Farm was in privity of 
contract with Hill as to the recovery of P.I.P. monies under the "Trust 
Agreement" contract conditions. State Farm paid Hill the sum of 
$6,120 for P.I.P no fault benefits. While State Farm now asserts that 
it stepped into the shoes of Caldwell only in pursuing the subrogation 
claim for property damage, such contention is fatally flawed and 
must fail for the reality is State Farm's subrogation claim worked as 
a detriment to Hill in that he would ultimately receive less money 
from the settlement with CUMIS in that the release signed by 
Appellant Hill and his wife recited consideration of $22,345, and 
specifically stated: 
It is understood that the above amount of twenty 
two thousand two hundred and forty five and 
no/100 Dollars ($22,245.00) represents twenty five 
thousand and no/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) policy 
limits less the collision claim of five thousand five 
hundred ten and no/100 Dollars ($5,510.00) by 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, wherein a 
controversy exists as to who is entitled to the said 
amount, and that the matter will be resolved 
between the two or by pay into court or by judicial 
determination. 
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Although State Farm restricts Appellants' complaints of bad 
faith to its refusal to waive its subrogation claim, such restriction is 
not accurate. Appellants' foremost bad faith complaint with State 
Farm arises out of State Farm's total failure to investigate whether 
the low limit CUMIS insurance monies were sufficient to satisfy 
Appellants' wrongful death claims. 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) 
concluded that: 
. . . the obligation of good faith performance 
contemplates at the very least, that the insurer will 
diligently investigate the facts to enable it to 
determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly 
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly 
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. 
The duty of good faith also requires the insurer . . . 
to refrain from actions that will injure the insured's 
ability to obtain the benefits of the contract, 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) 
The record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that State Farm 
reasonably investigated whether (1) the CUMIS proceeds were 
sufficient to satisfy Appellants' wrongful death claims, (2) State 
Farm's claim for subrogation was in fact valid under Utah law given 
the doctrine of "equitable subrogation," and (3) Appellants' claim that 
State Farm was not entitled to subrogation or repayment of P.I.P. 
benefits was valid. 
Appellants assert that any reasonable investigation would 
show (a) that the $50,000.00 CUMIS policy was not sufficient to 
satisfy the Appellants' wrongful death claims but in fact was wholly 
inadequate; [R. 271-274] (b) that Appellants' attorneys had 
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conducted investigations to determine the same matters; [R. 271-
274] and (c) that Appellants' attorneys had useful and valid 
information that State Farm could use in its investigation and in 
making its evaluations [R. 271-274], 
On the contrary, State Farm arbitrarily rejected Appellants' 
claims and upheld its own claims without any reasonable 
investigation of facts necessary to make fair evaluations and 
decisions. Based upon its conduct in continuing to assert the 
subrogation and P.I.P. reimbursement claims, State Farm's 
determinations were as follows: 
(1) Appellants' wrongful death claims were satisfied by 
the CUMIS payment of $50,000.00; that is to say Appellants 
were made whole for the wrongful death of two (2) 
outstanding children by the total payment of $50,000.00. 
(2) Because Appellants' claims were satisfied by the 
payment of $50,000.00, State Farm was entitled to satisfy its 
claim for subrogation as to the $5,510.00 paid to Caldwell for 
damage to his property, and State Farm was entitled to 
reimbursement from Caldwell and Hill for P.I.P. payments in 
the sum of $12,659.00 under the trust agreement provisions of 
the Caldwell contract. 
(3) Appellants' claim that State Farm was not entitled 
to subrogation or repayment of P.I.P. benefits should be 
rejected. 
(4) The legal burden and duty was upon grief-stricken 
and devastated parents to file a lawsuit, relive the worst days 
of their lives and take that suit to judgment to show State Farm 
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that the wrongful deaths of two outstanding teenage children 
were worth more than $25,000.00 each. 
(5) State Farm had no duty or burden to investigate 
whether its subrogation and trust agreement claims were good 
claims under Utah law given the unrefutable facts of this case. 
(6) State Farm could enforce its claimed rights to 
subrogation and recovery of the P.I.P. monies as such actions 
would not injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefit of 
the insurance contract. [R. 262-266] 
POINT V: STATE FARM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS PREMATURE; APPELLANTS 
WOULD BE ALLOWED A REASONABLE TIME IN 
WHICH TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY. 
Although Appellants filed this lawsuit some years ago, little 
time has been available for discovery. This matter was originally 
filed on November 18, 1983. Defendant's first motion for summary 
judgment was filed on September 12, 1984, and was granted by the 
trial court on October 22, 1984. A lengthy appeal followed with final 
disposition on November 1, 1988. Following the decision on appeal, 
Appellants unsuccessfully attempted settlement of this matter. On 
May 4, 1989, State Farm filed another motion for summary 
judgment. At the same time, Mr. Lauchnor, Appellants' original 
attorney in this matter, determined that he would most likely be a 
witness and would have to withdraw as counsel. [R. 292-294] State 
Farm has filed its latest motion for summary judgment based on the 
same facts found insufficient to support summary judgment the first 
time around. 
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Judicial economy and the interest of justice will be better 
served if Appellants are allowed leave to file their First Amended 
Complaint and time to complete discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
On the same facts and evidence that Appellants rely on in this 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm 
Mutual Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah, 1988) held that State 
Farm must show that [Appellants] were either fully compensated or 
that Appellants' action in releasing Bryan breached the insurance 
policy entitling State Farm to subrogation reimbursement as a matter 
of equity. State Farm has proved neither; material issues of fact on 
these questions, together with Appellants bad faith claims, iustifv a 
trial on the merits. 
The Hills and Caldwells remain uncompensated for the money 
losses that State Farm's unwarranted subrogation claims have caused 
them; losses that include the attorney fees of Wallace Lauchnor, the 
economic loss that State Farm's interference with the CUMIS 
settlement caused them and the emotional and mental anguish State 
Farm's bad faith caused them. This long ordeal of the Hills and 
Caldwells can not be allowed to end by State Farm's relinquishment 
of the subrogation claim after the irreparable damage to the 
Appellants had been done. 
Appellants respectfully submit that the summary judgments 
above be reversed; the District Court's denial of Appellant's motion 
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for leave to file their First Amended Complaint be reversed; and the 
case be remanded for a trial of all causes of action. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(QY/AjlACOBXON, JR/ [A4480] 
1265-^ull Rake Drive 
Jackson, Wyoming 83001 
(307) 733-7290 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
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